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The Backgrounder in Brief
Fear of lawsuits may inhibit employers from steering employees into
defined-contribution pension plans and RRSPs, and from guiding
them into sensible choices for investing and withdrawing their
money. Safe-harbour provisions that reduced this threat would help
employers act in good faith to enhance the retirement incomes of
Canadians.
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major shift is taking place in the types of pensions available to
Canadian workers. Defined-benefit (DB) plans, in which the employer
shoulders the risk of making good on benefit payments, are covering
relatively fewer workers. Increasingly, employers are offering
employees money-purchase plans, which include defined-contribution (DC) plans
and group RRSPs. The share of employed Canadians covered by DC plans is on
the rise, and the number of Canadians contributing to RRSPs in a given year
exceeds membership in all registered plans (Figure 1).
1
Some experts bemoan the decline of DB plans; others argue that DB promises
were never reliable and that money-purchase arrangements are more transparent.
There is no disagreement, however, about one problematic fact: many participants
in money-purchase arrangements, especially group RRSPs, will likely save, invest,
or withdraw their funds in sub-optimal ways that leave them worse off in
retirement than they could have been. Many employers would like to enhance
their employees’ retirement prospects, and those who offer matching contributions
to induce their employees to join and save in these plans demonstrate that desire
in a material way. But with pension-related litigation on the rise, employers who
would like to encourage their employees to save, invest and withdraw more
wisely may nevertheless pull back for fear of lawsuits. “Safe harbours” for such
employers — legal protection for good-faith actions to foster smart employee
choices — could improve the outlook for Canadians who will do most of their
retirement saving in such plans.
Common Problems in Self-Directed Retirement Saving
To illuminate where safe-harbour provisions might help plan sponsors, I review
several problems that can arise when participants in money-purchase plans
control their contribution rates and investment choices — and ways plan sponsors
might mitigate them.
Problem 1: Potential participants do not join. Current cash requirements may keep
employees out of plans — even when the employer offers matching
contributions.
2 To address this problem, employers could make automatic
enrolment the default option, so non-participation becomes an active decision.
Problem 2: Participants do not save enough. Once people are in a plan, seemingly
compelling short-term needs may stop them contributing as much as they could
— possibly leaving part of a matching contribution on the table. To address this
problem, employers might set a default contribution rate that applies unless the
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I thank Keith Ambachtsheer, Bob Baldwin, Colin Busby, Bob Christie, Bruce Gordon, Martin
Guest, Yvan Guillemette, Zaheed Jiwani, Nick Le Pan, Tammy Schirle, Jack Selody, Gretchen Van
Riesen and Diana Woodhead for comments on an earlier draft.
1 The comparison of plan membership to RRSP contributors is highly imperfect: many RRSP
contributors are members of pension plans, and many RRSP holders do not contribute in a given
year. Unfortunately, existing data limit our ability to make more meaningful comparisons.
2 A seminal reference on non-linear discounting is Laibson et al. (1998). US experience (discussed
further below) has shown that making enrolment the default choice strongly affects behaviour. employee actively chooses to contribute at a lower rate. Lest a high default level
encourage opting out, employers might start participants at a lower initial rate,
and move to the higher one at regular intervals.
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Problem 3: Participants invest unwisely. Participants may deploy the funds they do
contribute inappropriately.
4 They may take too much risk. Or they may use daily
interest accounts, money-market funds or GICs, accepting low returns for liquidity
they do not use. Participants in group RRSPs also often use vehicles with high
administration fees, undermining their returns and sacrificing contribution room.
5
To address these problems, employers might steer participants into life-cycle-
appropriate portfolios and/or vehicles with lower administration fees.
Problem 4: Participants cash out ineptly. Many participants exit from retirement
saving in group RRSPs with lump-sum or rapid withdrawals that expose them to
outliving their assets or paying unnecessary tax.
6 To address this problem,
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3 A related concern is that people may have trouble adjusting their saving rate when surprises in
the return on their investments threaten a given target retirement income. A default contribution
rate designed to address this problem might steer participants toward a target payout, rising if
investment returns were lower than expected, and falling if they were higher.
4 Readers will readily bring examples to mind; a seminal reference is Benartzi and Thaler (2001).
5 Paying fees from outside an RRSP uses "uncapped" money, but is not an option for, say, mutual-
fund investors.
6 Again, Laibson et al. (1998) is a classic reference.
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Tables 282-0008, 280-0016 and 111-0039.employers might set a default annuitization option at the end of a career or a
staged option as the end approaches.
Problem 5: Participants use their own untrained judgement or badly selected advisers in
deciding whether to join, how much to save, how to invest, and how to terminate. To
address these problems, all of which are related to the previous four — and which
do not yield readily to simple investor education (Choi et al. 1998) — employers
may make group and individual advisory services another default option.
The Dangers of Inaction
Many sponsors of money-purchase plans in Canada know about these problems.
So do Canadian regulators: the Capital Accumulation Plan Guidelines (CAP
Guidelines) from the Joint Forum of Financial Market Regulators provides a useful
checklist of measures to address them.
7 The CAP Guidelines aim to clarify the
rights and responsibilities of plan sponsors, service providers and participants,
and ensure that participants get appropriate advice and help. Helpful though they
are as a benchmark for good practice, and therefore for avoiding behaviour that
might give rise to a lawsuit, the Guidelines provide no direct legal protection to
those who follow them — indeed, they may end up serving as a guide to
litigation, and therefore deter employers from venturing into this area.
So the prospect of litigation creates a dilemma for employers. Leave employees
to make decisions on their own? A future lawsuit may reference the emerging
“prudent expert” standard in pension matters, and allege that a sponsor breached
fiduciary duty in not behaving paternalistically. Act paternalistically? A future
lawsuit may allege that a disappointing outcome resulted from actions the
employee would not otherwise have taken.
The evidence that all these problems do afflict money-purchase plans is
convincing enough to make paralysis unpalatable in the face of this dilemma.
Employers are already abandoning the DB option partly because of legal concerns;
it would be a blow to retirement security more generally if they declined to
sponsor even such basic money-purchase alternatives as group RRSPs as well. As
the polarized debate and political deadlock over reforms to DB plans suggest,
moreover, constructive action is likely to be easier before actual disputes and
vested interests become major obstacles. Hence, the attractiveness of timely federal
and provincial pension legislation providing legal safe harbours for employers
who, in good faith, steer their employees toward wise choices in money-purchase
plans.
8
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7 Joint Forum of Financial Market Regulators (2004). The CAP Guidelines cover defined-
contribution pension plans and group RRSPs, as well as other saving vehicles such as Registered
Education Savings Plans and deferred profit-sharing plans.
8 Defined-contribution plans fall under both federal or provincial pension legislation; group RRSPs
are effectively governed by the Federal Income Tax Act.US Experience and Initiatives
Because Canada’s experience with money-purchase plans is not unique,
experience abroad provides some useful lessons. In particular, the United States —
where the move toward individual retirement accounts has gone further than in
Canada — has recently refined its safe-harbour provisions.
The US Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) has long aimed to give
sponsors of money-purchase plans who provide participants appropriate choices
and advice some protection from liability for losses arising from those choices.
9
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 elaborated those protections for sponsors who
automatically enrol employees and/or automatically raise contribution levels over
time, as long as appropriate notice is given and opt-outs exist. It extended the
protections related to inadequate or directed choice. It also focused on what advice
to employees will satisfy prudential obligations. Some observers credit these
changes with making automatic enrolment more common in the United States,
and increasing the number of employers who automatically escalate
contributions.
10
On the cautionary side, the regulations giving further shape to the amended
US legislation are not yet final; current drafts look highly prescriptive. The
excessive detail of the draft regulations, moreover, reflects the fact that litigation
over these plans in the United States is rife — much of it alleging excessive, poorly
explained, or improperly structured fees, an area where the ERISA already
contained safe-harbour provisions. The volume and variety of these suits
guarantees different interpretations from different courts. Presumably, the US
Supreme Court will settle some of these issues, but until then, uncertainty reigns
south of the border — increasing the apprehension of actual and potential
Canadian plan sponsors.
An Outline for Canadian Action
Rather than a deterrent, then, the unsettled US scene should be a spur to Canada
to pursue its own measures. While the US provisions are helpful for illustrating
the types of actions safe-harbour legislation can usefully cover, they risk becoming
so prescriptive that they impede rather than aid well-motivated employers. And
while the CAP Guidelines document best practices, they arguably set fiduciary
standards without legal protections for those trying to meet them. How might
Canadian legislators approach the problems outlined above?
First, they should address roadblocks to automatic enrolment, and give
employers guidance about what kinds of automatic enrolment and contribution
escalation features will be safe. Provinces that now require employers to get
4 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
9 Section 404(c) is the key part of ERISA dealing with safe harbours, and was a particular focus of
the 2006 amendments.
10 Tyson (2007) cites a survey of 350 employers nationwide by Wells Fargo & Co. that showed 44
percent using automatic enrolment, and a survey of 1,000 401(k) and profit-sharing plans by the
Profit-Sharing Council of America that showed a more-than-doubling of the employers that
automatically increased contribution rates in 2006, to 39 percent.employees’ written authorization to make deductions for pension-plan
contributions would need to change those provisions. Key criteria regarding auto-
enrolment and escalation features would be the type and time-period of notice to
employees that is required, and the means by which employees who do not wish
to participate at all, or wish to contribute at some level different from the default,
can opt out. US safe-harbour provisions in this area are over-detailed — specifying
escalation schedules, for example. More useful are processes ensuring that
individuals who know more about their own life expectancies and risk tolerance
than their employers are not forced to save more than they consider appropriate.
Second, employers need protection as they seek to steer employees into wise
choices. DC plans are not, in general, the main focus of concern in this respect:
employers have considerable control over investments offered in them, and
regulations generally constrain withdrawals from DC plans at termination and
conversion of plan balances into income at retirement.
11 Group RRSPs are a
different matter: many employees would benefit from guidance both while they
are building their savings and when they begin to draw them down. As with
enrolment and contribution rates, however, detailed rules will be unhelpful,
potentially deterring employers from supporting plans.
Detailed rules could also stifle innovation. Over time, for example, new life-
cycle accumulation vehicles will arise — automatically moving more of a
participant’s portfolio into bonds that match annuity price fluctuations as
retirement approaches. More securitized investments in retirement-appropriate
assets such as infrastructure and real estate will also become available. Prescribing
portfolios is no job for legislators or regulators. More useful are processes, such as
the CAP Guidelines’ provisions regarding the frequency with which participants
should be allowed to transfer their funds from one vehicle into another, that let
participants avoid default options that do not suit them.
A particular focus of safe-harbour rules regarding portfolio choice will be the
size and transparency of fees. Responding to past litigation, the 2006 amendments
in the United States are intended to protect employers as long as fees received by
an adviser do not depend on participants’ investments, and to enhance the
requirements for disclosure of fees to participants. Canadian safe-harbour
protections could also usefully cover service providers — whose fees will be a
natural target for discontented participants, and who ought to share responsibility
with employers for ensuring that participants know how much, and for what, they
are paying.
Next Steps
Regulation of money-purchase pension plans is jurisdictionally divided in Canada.
Many pension advocates, moreover, see the problems of money-purchase plans
that safe-harbour provisions would address as drawbacks serious enough to
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11 I note in passing that the rules governing withdrawals from DC plans are restrictive enough to
cause hardship to many retirees who need more flexibility — another illustration of the merits of
framework legislation that helps employers and employees make mutually agreeable
arrangements, as opposed to detailed prescriptions. justify discouraging these plans. From that point of view, bolstering the classic
single-employer DB plan or moving more energetically to pooled large-scale
hybrid DB/money-purchase arrangements (Ambachtsheer 2007; Laidler and
Robson 2007) would appear a priority — and one from which smaller
improvements to the environment for money-purchase plans are a distraction.
While these facts may mean that a national safe-harbour system is not in
immediate prospect, the factors that are eroding DB-plan participation — legal
and regulatory complexities, and growing awareness among sponsors that DB
plans expose them to worse legal risks and more profound economic uncertainties
than they knew — are not going away. So there is good reason to act soon.
A reasonable near-term step for policymakers motivated to improve the
situation would be legislative or regulatory endorsement of the CAP Guidelines as
a safe harbour for employers. Giving the Guidelines such standing would mean
that they no longer raise the fiduciary bar without providing protection — which
could deter employers from supporting money-purchase plans. It would also spur
employers to ensure that their plans are up to standard — a desirable outcome,
since the problems surveyed in this paper guarantee that the design and
governance of most such plans in Canada could improve.
Money-purchase arrangements, and group RRSPs in particular, are where
many — perhaps most — Canadians will do most of their retirement saving for
many years to come. Their situation is far from ideal. To let fear of litigation
paralyze employers who would like to improve it is unwise. Adding safe harbours
to Canadian pension legislation and regulation would empower employers to act
in ways that would enhance the retirement incomes of their employees.
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